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1.  Introduction 
The often considerable wealth transfer from entrepreneurs and corporate insiders to minority outside 
investors participating in the firm for first time in its initial primary offering (IPO) debut through 
substantially deflated issue prices in relation to the true market value of stock has been the subject of 
a considerable literature (see Smart and Zutter (2003) for detailed review).  However the 
overwhelming majority of this literature is focussed on uncovering the underlying agency-based 
motivations of insiders for initiating IPO underpricing of stock and the signals selectively available to 
IPO firms that influence relative levels of underpricing within a single country context.  These single 
country studies are overwhelmingly dominated by those focussed on large developed US IPO market 
(e.g. Smart and Zutter, 2003 and Arthurs et al, 2008) alongside other developed markets such as UK 
(Brennan and Franks, 1997) and more recently UK and France (Bruton et al, 2010) and Germany 
(Tykova and Walz, 2007).  It is only more recently that a cross country comparative literature has 
started to emerge seeking to elaborate on the institutional and corporate governance (at legislative 
level) differences that impact on often considerable variations in IPO underpricing in worldwide 
equity markets (see Boulton et al, 2010).  However a shortfall in this emerging latter cross-country 
comparative literature is the almost exclusive focus on the impact of high level institutional 
differences pervasive across countries with the wholesale omission from consideration of important 
market participants, such as lead managers and private equity entities.  Their presence in particular 
acts to mitigate asymmetric information surrounding the transformation of the firm from private to 
public realm during the IPO process.  My first contribution to literature is in addressing this shortfall 
in studying the impact of both lead managers and private equity entities alongside differences in 
national institutional quality on IPO underpricing. 
 North Africa forms the distinctive geographic focus of this study due to the proximity to 
Europe and the distinctive nature of the region’s economy with this being made up from extensive 
interlinked networks of firms that are constituent to one, or often several overlapping, business 
groups controlled by large extended families.  The region’s IPO markets have also been largely 
omitted from study in the literature with the exception of the inclusion of Egypt in a wider 49 country 
dataset of La Porta et al (1997) and Hearn (2011, 2013).  The former La Porta study focuses on 
country-level institutions while the latter two studies by Hearn focus on the role and impact of 
extended family networks firstly on IPO firm underpricing and secondly on aggregate board salary, 
an agency-based incentive measure.  The region is also subject to an incongruous mix of French civil 
code law formal institutions, themselves shaped largely on original unreformed Napoleonic 
framework since their adoption during colonial rule, and deeper informal institutions making up the 
fabric of Maghreb society, based on classical Islamic shari’ya law (Hearn, 2011; Kuran, 2004).  This 
incongruity alongside a pronounced role of state in development, eschewed through the Dirigiste 
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tradition in Francophone countries and socialism in Egypt, has been attributed to economic and social 
structural rigidities that gave rise to the recent unprecedented period of political and social upheaval, 
popularly termed as the Arab Spring (BBC news, 2011).  Consequently there is considerable national 
policy-level emphasis on economic rejuvenation across the region with added importance attached to 
both the role of entrepreneurs and growth firms as well as their ability to access finance through 
capital markets and private equity entities.  As such it is timely to undertake a study on this region’s 
primary equity markets and the determinants of IPO underpricing. 
 The role of early-stage private equity financiers as well as essential market participants to IPO 
offers such as underwriters in determining levels of underpricing has received considerable attention 
in the literature.  Private equity finance is well recognized in being strategically placed to provide 
capital to firms subject to extremely high asymmetric information, such as those with minimal track 
records at start-up (see Berger and Udell, 1998 for an extensive literature review).  A key 
differentiating feature of private equity as opposed to investors simply seeking to derive benefits 
from diversification of risks associated with personal portfolios is in the level of active management 
and participation undertaken within portfolio investee firms (Barry et al, 1990).  As such private 
equity financiers are best placed to provide superior monitoring and surveillance of investee firms 
and their management and thus have superior access to information otherwise either unavailable or 
prohibitively costly to obtain for more widely dispersed outsider investors.  However while the 
certification of value (signalling theory) of private equity entities is well documented in the literature 
(see Barry et al (1990) and Bruton et al (2010)) there is conjecture as to the impact of this on IPO 
underpricing.  In recognition of the superior monitoring role played by venture capitalists (VC), 
Barry et al (1990) argues that VC involvement in a firm leads to their maintaining a larger equity 
stake following the IPO with less underpricing than comparable non-VC backed firms.  In this way 
VC-backing certifies the intrinsic value of the firm to the market and reduces uncertainty 
(asymmetric information) reflected in the necessity for larger IPO discounts to attract minority 
investors (Leland and Pyle, 1977).  This certification view is also supported by Megginson and Weiss 
(1991) and Gompers (1996).  However a contrasting view of the impact of VC-backing on IPO firm 
underpricing is largely derived from deeper arguments regarding the role of VC entities and their 
interaction with other participants critical to the success of the IPO such as underwriters (Loughran 
and Ritter, 2004).  In this light Hoberg and Seyhun (2006) argue that VC managers and underwriters 
are repeat collaborators in a “business game” where the former accept elevated levels of underpricing 
knowing these will be of benefit to the latter.  Underwriters assist with marketing support for the new 
lines of stock, attraction of favourable analyst coverage following IPO event which thus enable IPO 
firm executives and VC managers to sell their shareholdings later at a higher price.  However a 
common drawback across the literature is the consideration of private equity and in particular, VC, as 
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a singular entity.  Recently Tykova and Walz (2007) drew distinctions between different classes of 
VC in terms of their being public(state)-backed, independent private sector entities or with 
prestigious reputation in terms of their impact on underpricing in German IPOs.  However these 
distinctions fail to take into account the breadth of the private equity market and in particular the 
presence of informal business angel investors (see Mason and Harrison (2002); Webb et al (2012) 
and Maxwell et al (2011)) as well as the distinction between domestic as opposed to foreign VC 
activity.  As such the study of the differential impact of business angels, domestic and foreign VC on 
IPO firm underpricing forms my second contribution to literature. 
 A key assumption behind the certification role of VC managers is that of the potential loss of 
reputational capital motivating them to signal the true value of the firm to outside investors at IPO.  
Reputation is essential for VC managers both in order to secure future order flow in the form of the 
attraction of more entrepreneurs but also in terms of the valuable relationships they build with 
underwriters, which would be forfeited if certification was false (Megginson and Weiss, 1991).  
Reputation is deemed key in both the VC manager attracting equally high quality underwriters with 
whom to work on achieving a successful IPO and vice-versa with reputable underwriters selecting 
the best VC firms (Megginson and Weiss, 1991).  However in Francophone capital markets, 
including those of North Africa, underwriters as market participants are less common, while the role 
of lead manager is enhanced, albeit with this being termed as Chef de File (Hearn, 2011).  The 
smaller size of equity markets across the Maghreb region together with relatively infrequent IPO 
activity infers that the measures of reputation employed for underwriters in very large and active US 
market (see Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Carter and Manaster (1990)) are only marginally 
effective.  Consequently I develop a new measure of reputation, which is applied to Chef de File or 
lead managers, which is based on a simple aggregation of reputation based on IPO gross proceeds as 
well as the proportion of total IPOs with which the lead manager has been involved.  While this is an 
extension of that of Megginson and Weiss, the inclusion of experience (proportion of all IPO’s in 
market for which lead manager has been involved) adds an additional dimension that is particularly 
relevant for smaller emerging markets where gross proceeds, alongside IPO order flow itself, can be 
erratic in size and frequency.  This forms my third contribution to literature. 
 Using a unique and comprehensive hand-collected sample set of 86 IPO firms from across 
North African equity markets, namely Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria from 2000 to 2013 I find 
substantial evidence supporting the Brennan and Franks (1997) insider control hypothesis.  While 
certification effected are likely achieved through IPO firms engaging with foreign VC managers 
leading to a reduction in underpricing the opposite is true of domestic VC.  Similarly foreign lead 
managers reduce underpricing while elevated lead manager reputation is associated with significantly 
higher underpricing.  This evidence would allude to the employment of domestic VC managers, and 
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domestic lead managers, who score more highly in reputational terms, in terms of stimulating excess 
demand for shares offered.  This excess demand can be used to facilitate discriminatory rationing to 
prevent the coalescing of small block shareholder who be incentivized to monitor dominant insider 
groups.  This assertion is further confirmed by rates of oversubscription being as high as 10,000% for 
some IPOs in Morocco alone.  In this light IPO underpricing can be viewed as the permissible degree 
of wealth transfer that controlling insider groups are prepared to accept in order to retain control.  In 
terms of the highly socially networked economies of Maghreb region it is reflective of the softer 
extension of control across more disparate entities and firms constituent to extended family business 
groups, such as shared directors, mutual socialization of boards, shared CEO and Chairpersons as 
well as elaborate network of pyramid and cross-shareholdings as opposed to the concentrated cash 
flow ownership within firm as envisaged by Brennan and Franks (1997) and Smart and Zutter (2003).  
A further key finding is that IPO underpricing across North Africa’s socially networked economies is 
strongly associated to institutional quality, as defined by the six well-established World Bank 
Governance measures.  In particular IPO underpricing is strongly reduced by increases in state-level 
corruption control.  It is equally reduced, albeit by a smaller degree, with improvements in 
government effectiveness, defined as ability of government to formulate and enact policies, political 
stability and rule of law.  This would lend support to the findings of Boulton et al (2010) that IPO 
underpricing is influenced by elevated private benefits of control which is closely linked to 
asymmetric information of firms listing.  Finally we find evidence that foreign VC managers are 
more likely to be exclusively associated with foreign lead managers in IPOs while business angels 
are more likely associated with foreign VC and less likely with their domestic VC counterparts.  This 
further alludes to constrained nature of domestic VC entities in smaller emerging economies that are 
characterised by highly socialized inter-relationships and business groups. 
 I proceed with the next section outlining the key institutional characteristics of North African 
equity markets.  Section 3 outlines theory and hypothesis construction while Section 4 outlines data 
and methods.  Section 5 discusses the results and the final section concludes. 
 
2.  Institutional characteristics of North African equity markets 
The capital markets of North Africa are some of the oldest on African continent with the Bourse de 
Casablanca established in 1929 while Egypt’s Alexandria bourse was formed in 1885 followed by 
Cairo’s stock exchange in 1903.  The two latter exchanges were the forerunners to the current 
integrated Egyptian exchange.  However the governance of all of the Maghreb region’s exchanges 
alongside many of the key actors in the respective markets is largely reflective of the business 
environments within which they are embedded.  The boards of national stock exchanges are primarily 
composed of directors representing brokerage houses that are members.  Many of these in turn are 
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themselves constituent to much more extensive business groups, often centred on families, that 
permeate both public sector (state) and private sectors.  Inspection of domestic VC entities and their 
descriptions outlined in IPO firms listing prospectuses from across the region reveals a similar 
picture.  Here open ended VC funds, termed as SICAV or SICAF in Morocco and Tunisia, are 
comparably structured to their European and North American counterparts with general partners 
acting as private equity operators, or managers, and limited partners participating in funds as 
investors.  Funds such as the Maghreb private equity fund I and II may be domiciled in Cyprus or 
Switzerland.  However control over various funds is vested in general partners, themselves linked to 
underlying family business group, and often the majority of limited partner investment is from same, 
or closely linked, business group.  This network control and influence permeating through Moroccan 
and Tunisian economies is also underscored by equally subtle distinctions in the involvement in IPO 
firms by entities such as Morocco’s CDG and SNI.  The latter in particular being 100% owned by 
Moroccan state can take the form of formal state-participation in IPO firm’s ownership structure or 
that of an actively managed and involved VC manager.  However participation by the latter SNI 
entity is more ambiguous.  This is wholly owned by King Mohammed VI as a personal investment 
vehicle and both engages in VC and private equity investment while also forming a sizeable business 
group, including entities such as Attarijariwafa Bank and related lead managers and subsidiary 
network, themselves organized as a sub-business group.  It is also an active partner in SOMED, a 
private equity joint venture with a Saudi Arabian sovereign entity. 
 Extended family business groups are a prominent feature across all Maghreb countries and 
while those emanating from state and quasi-state sources in Morocco and Tunisia invest in centrally 
determined patterns, determined by state and its representative elites, along the lines of the Dirigiste 
(state-led) capitalist tradition, Egypt is different.  The business environment of Egypt has largely 
been shaped by the adoption of socialism and subsequent nationalisation of industries, including 
large family conglomerates, during the 1960’s under General Abdel Nasser.  IPO order flow in this 
country has thus been largely made up from the divesting of state holdings, vested through various 
government ministries, themselves acting as holding entities for a wide range of previously 
nationalized industries, and the re-emergence of older Egyptian families, such as Sawaris, retaking 
control over their formerly state-controlled assets. 
 There are some notable regulatory differences across North Africa’s equity markets.  Egypt is 
notable in following the self-regulatory model, in line with many English-speaking countries despite 
its legal and governmental system being based on that transplanted by Napoleonic France.  The 
Egyptian Financial Services Authority has surveillance oversight over the operations of Egyptian 
stock exchange alongside an array of sanctions against behaviour by participants deemed detrimental 
to maintenance of orderly market (EFSA website, 2013).  IPO prospectuses are formed by firms from 
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the employment of independent auditors and accountants with IPO itself managed by a team of lead 
managers, book runners, and brokers in order to precipitate minority investor order flow.  However in 
marked contrast to this self-regulatory model the regulatory bodies in Morocco and Tunisia have 
considerably more influence in listing process.  One notable feature of prospectuses resulting from 
this more intrusive involvement is the publication of valuation techniques used to gauge size of 
discount factor, itself used to discount future projected cash flows thereby giving rise to issue price of 
shares.  In contrast this is completely omitted in Egypt.  The Conseil Déontologique des Valeurs 
Mobilières (CDVM, 2013), in Morocco, Conseil du Marché Financier (CMF, 2013), in Tunisia, and 
Commission d'Organisation et de Surveillance des Opérations de Bourse (COSOB, 2013), in Algeria, 
all analyse prospectuses, accounting and auditing information and accuracy of valuation techniques 
used in IPO prospectuses prior to issuing a “visa” permitting the IPO to be undertaken.  Thus the 
primary markets in these Francophone countries are subject to considerable state-centred control.  A 
final distinctive feature between Egypt and it’s Francophone neighbours is the ubiquitous presence of 
a dedicated underwriting industry.  The Francophone markets all exclusively use a dedicated 
“syndicat de placement”, formed from members of the local brokerage community, and managed by 
the Chef de File of the IPO.  Often different syndicates are formed, depending on expertise of 
constituent members, for each listing component, with these typically being characterized as 
proportions of shares marketed at employees, domestic retail, domestic institutional and foreign 
institutional investors alike.  The placement of offered shares between each set of dedicated investors 
is undertaken on a rotational basis until all available offered shares are allocated during this process. 
 
3.  Background literature and hypotheses 
The IPO process exposes considerable incongruity and conflict between the motivational goals of 
participants to that process – be these inside the firm, such as insider groups and executives as well as 
private equity entities, or outside the firm in the case of Lead Managers (Chef de File), placement 
syndicate members, brokers and other external market entities.  Arthurs et al (2008) outlines that the 
central focus of traditional agency theory is that insider groups to the firm are core to agency costs 
and thus extends this theoretical perspective to take into account divergent goals and investment time 
horizons of various entities that are reflected in differences in decision-making and ultimately 
reflected in levels of underpricing.  As such Arthurs et al (2008) introduce multiple agency theory, an 
extension of behavioural agency (following Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) in focussing 
primarily on the nexus of relationships emanating from the underwriter employed for the IPO.  
However a major shortfall in the Arthurs study alongside applications such as Bruton et al (2010) is 
that the focus is on very large, well established capital markets in developed countries with relatively 
flat political economies.  Here separation of ownership from control is largely as envisaged by Berle 
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and Means (1932) through widely dispersed principals (owner-shareholders) and managerial agents 
incumbent to the firm.  This is also a critical implicit assumption in the “insider control” hypothesis 
first proposed by Brennan and Franks (1997) within the context of the UK equity market.  However 
significant evidence questioning this form of separation of cash flow ownership from control (voting 
rights) was first raised by Claessens et al (2000) in a study of East Asian corporations.  The findings 
revealed separation of ownership from control was achieved through pyramidal schemes and further 
reinforced through extensive cross-shareholdings while softer managerial socialization measures 
were also apparent, such as shared directors and CEO/Chairpersons between firms.  Similar evidence 
of extended business groups formed in this manner has since been found across both North Africa, in 
Hearn (2011, 2013), but also across the wider continent of Africa (Hearn, 2013a).  As such North 
Africa provides an ideal environment within which to extend the theoretical basis arising from 
nascent multiple agency perspective.  Countries across the region are largely dominated by handfuls 
of social elites empowered at independence and who form the backbone of local political economies, 
the national institutions are principally shaped by French civil code law legal and governmental 
systems.  While these promote the central role of state in credit allocation nationally, the permeation 
of both state architecture as well as private sector realms by extensive business groups underscores 
the extent of control of social elites across the region.  Thus the proliferation of business groups 
based on handfuls of dominant families are both a product of centralising role of state as engendered 
in French civil code law systems and dirigiste economic model as well as notions of morality and 
social justice reflected from deeper Islamic shari’ya law religious customs.  However a very recent 
literature arising from work of Khanna and Palepu (2000) and Khanna and Yafeh (2007) provides 
evidence that business groups are strategically advantageous in forming private equity and venture 
capital entities within the group, through being able to draw on superior resource capabilities of the 
group in business environments characterized by institutional deficiencies.  Thus the IPO event in 
North Africa involves the interplay of relationships based on influential Chef de File, charged with 
the management of the listing, their charged role of forming share placement syndicates, where 
indigenous brokerage firms are chosen to form a syndicate to market newly issued stock to various 
designated classes of investor, and finally domestic VC entities that in being insiders to the focal IPO 
firm are also privy to otherwise costly information regarding true value of firm and quality of 
management.  The domination of often extremely narrow indigenous political economies by handfuls 
of social elites, themselves tied to large dominant family groups, is reflected in the proliferation of 
their business groups throughout the economy with these exerting a controlling influence over lead 
managers, domestic VC entities and the often highly concentrated stock broker community that 
routinely forms placement syndicates in IPOs.  Conversely foreign VC entities and business angel 
investors are not subject to the same political economy constraints as their domestic VC counterparts.  
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There are also likely to be similarly differing motivations behind the employment of foreign lead 
managers (Chef de File) and lead managers with higher reputations, given the reputational measure is 
based on share of IPO gross proceeds raised and frequency of stock issues with which manager has 
been involved.  Hence a combination of this complex interplay of inter-relationships and 
consideration of the dominant forces of underlying political economy justify the application of a 
combination of nascent multiple agency perspective and signalling theories. 
 
2.1.  The contrasting effects of different private equity entities on IPO firm underpricing 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) argue that corporate insiders have considerable incentives for not 
revealing the true value of a firm and its assets as they can potentially sell securities for a higher price 
than their true value.  As such underpricing is the level of compensation sought by rational outside 
investors who know they have an informational disadvantage against insiders (Carter and Manaster, 
1990).  However underpricing represents a wealth transfer to outside investors and infers less cash 
with which the firm can use for more productive internal investment.  One method of overcoming the 
considerable asymmetric information between outside investor and incumbent insiders is through the 
latter undertaking credible signals regarding the quality of the firm (Leland and Pyle, 1977).  
However Megginson and Weiss (1991) argue that a major problem with this is that insiders have 
everything to gain from falsely signalling and while Tinic (1988) argues that disclosure regulation is 
likely to discourage flagrant omissions and fraud, outside investors are more likely to accept signals 
from a third party which has considerable reputational capital at stake through the conveyance of 
inaccurate information. 
 Extending these arguments on the certification role of credible third parties and private equity 
is strategically placed to undertake this role.  However while there is a considerable literature 
studying the impact of VC entities, very little is known about the governance impact of business 
angel (BA) investors (Bruton et al, 2010).  These individual investors are often not motivated by 
potential financial reward from investing in firms but rather because of the “fun” of investing in an 
entrepreneurial venture and being able to socially interact informally with a fellow entrepreneur (see 
Mason and Harrison (2002) and Maxwell et al (2011) for comprehensive review of very recent 
literature regarding these investors).  BA investors are notable as this class of investor are already 
successful entrepreneurs in their own right and thus when investing are doing so as their own 
principals (not agents to their own investors in turn) (Bruton et al, 2010).  BA investors will have 
considerable reputational capital at stake given their intentions of becoming successful serial angel 
investors and thus generating further future order flow from other entrepreneurs, they will act to 
reduce agency costs with minority outside investors entering firm for first time at IPO (Bruton et al, 
2010).  As such BA investors presence is more likely to act as a credible third party signal to 
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minority outside investors thereby reducing agency costs and signalling quality and true value.  
Consequently I test the following hypothesis: 
 
H-1.1:  Presence of BA is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
 
VC entities in contrast to BA investors are rarely principals (owners) of their own investment funds 
and are commonly agents acting on behalf of their own principal investors (Balboa and Marti, 2007).  
There are also considerable differences in the structure and type of VC activity and ownership 
worldwide (Bruton et al, 2005).  Bruton et al (2005) details that VC entities in French civil code law 
countries are in particular more likely to be structured as extensions of existing banks in contrast to 
VC taking the form of general partners undertaking the investment decisions while benefiting from 
investment by limited partners participating in VC funds.  Furthermore evidence from Khanna and 
Palepu (2000) and Khanna and Yafeh (2007) reveals that the optimal coordinative ability of business 
groups is frequently associated with their within-group establishment of private equity, and 
particularly VC, entities.  However an overriding feature of domestic VC is that given the 
considerable permeation of both public and private sectors in smaller emerging economies with 
social elites, who themselves are affiliated to dominant family groups, and the ubiquitous nature of 
extended family business groups throughout economy that this type of VC is likely to be subject to 
considerable political constraint.  Furthermore domestic VC entities that are not subject to the 
overlapping extended control of family-controlled business groups are likely to be subject to 
considerable institutionalized mimetic and coercive pressures constraining their behaviour as 
investors and their interaction with other market participants.  Thus domestic VC entities are less 
likely to be motivated to signal quality and thus reduce agency cost but rather to engage in 
underpricing as a means of facilitating the retention of control by insiders, with whom they are 
inextricably socially tied.  As such I test the following hypothesis: 
 
H-1.2:  Presence of Domestic VC is positively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
 
In direct contrast to domestic VC, foreign VC managers are not subject to domestic political and 
ownership constraints that distort incentives to signal quality and engender collusive behaviour with 
other market participants through social ties prevalent in narrow political economies within which 
Maghreb markets are embedded.  As such the agency costs associated with foreign VC managers is 
more consistent with their achieving maximum returns on investments and thus undertaking high 
quality monitoring through active involvement in investee firms.  As such there is greater congruence 
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in motivations behind signalling true value of firm and its management which in turn leads to a 
reduction of agency costs.  Consequently I test the following hypothesis: 
 
H-1.3:  Presence of Foreign Venture Capital is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
 
2.3.  Lead manager effects on IPO firm underpricing 
The two primary measures of reputation in the literature are based on measures introduced by 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Carter and Manaster (1990).  These were introduced in the context 
of the role of underwriters in the large, well developed US equity market.  The former is based on a 
simple share of gross proceeds raised in IPOs with which the underwriter has involvement while the 
latter is based on the prestige of relative position in the tombstone lists of underwriters common to 
the front page of IPO firm listings prospectuses.  While both studies find evidence of an inverse 
relationship between underwriter quality and underpricing leading to a conjecture that higher quality 
underwriters are more effective in sending credible signals of quality to outside investors thereby 
reducing agency costs and the need for underpricing as a compensation measure for informational 
asymmetry.  However in direct to contrast to these findings from the large, well developed US 
market that benefits from being socially embedded in a relatively uniform political economy, the 
narrowness of emerging economies polities that are commonly dominated by handfuls of social elites 
underscores the necessity in considering other motivations.  In line with the Brennan and Franks 
(1997) thesis of “reduced monitoring hypothesis” effected through underpricing that in turn 
stimulates excess demand for shares offered at listing which in turn enables the discriminatory 
rationing of shares thereby preventing possibility of small block shareholders coalescing.  This 
“reduced monitoring hypothesis”, or insider control thesis is of particular important in economies 
underscored by family-controlled business groups where insider control is effected through a variety 
of mechanisms by which ownership is separated from control which are acutely sensitive to the 
formation of block shareholder groups with the motivation to question and effectively monitor 
insiders.  As such in this context lead managers with elevated reputations are more likely to be 
employed by IPO firm in order to effect “insider control”.  Consequently I test the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H-2.1:  Lead Manager reputation is positively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
 
In direct contrast to the “reduced monitoring hypothesis” argument of Brennan and Franks (1997) for 
lead managers with elevated reputation, signalling arguments dominate in terms of the employment 
of foreign lead managers by IPO firm.  Foreign lead managers are better placed to signal quality in 
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part to domestic investors through their ability to act as a conduit for international best practice in 
terms of governance and transparency but also in terms of marketing ability in being able to attract 
overseas investors through the enhanced visibility, reputational capital and recognition of their brand.  
Consequently I test the following hypothesis: 
 
H-2.2:  Presence of Foreign Lead Manager is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
 
2.4.  Impact of institutional quality on underpricing 
Boulton et al (2010) extend the theoretical “reduced monitoring hypothesis” argument originally 
developed by Brennan and Franks onto a cross-country international setting and in particular to the 
role of differing institutions worldwide.  As such the Boulton study argues that private benefits of 
control are easier for insiders to conceal while they can also act with relative impunity in 
environments characterised by weak institutions thus leading to a reduced need for underpricing as a 
form of compensation to minority outside investors.  Conversely increasing institutional quality has 
the opposite effect inferring a need for insiders to transfer wealth through underpricing so as to attract 
minority investors.  However a major shortfall in reduced monitoring hypothesis of Brennan and 
Franks is that it only considers insider control from viewpoint of higher cash flow ownership, and 
hence via the assumption of single class shares with uniform voting rights, control.  As such it is 
wholly based on the premise of Berle and Means (1932) of separation of ownership from control 
being achieved through genuine dispersion (diversification) of ownership.  However in stark contrast 
to this Claessens et al (2000) found substantial evidence of the separation of ownership from control 
being achieved almost universally across East Asia not via diversification but rather through 
pyramidal schemes, extensive networks of cross-shareholdings and softer techniques involving 
socialization and shared directors.  These alternative techniques for achieving separation of 
ownership from control are particularly prevalent in extended family business groups whose 
constituent members are mutually bound together through often powerful altruistic bonds to the 
family as a whole.  Consequently this method of separation of ownership from control is inherently 
different from that envisaged originally by Berle and Means in their work on US equity market and 
thus is relatively resistant to differences in state-level institutional quality.  This view is also 
supported by anecdotal evidence that North African countries have always had some of the highest 
institutional quality of the entire continent of Africa with Tunisia and Morocco being comparable in 
quality to Western European countries such as Spain and Portugal all the while the economies were 
formed from extended family-controlled business groups (Hearn, 2011, 2013).  Further support can 
be obtained from the Boulton study given their multi-country sample is almost wholly dominated by 
very large, developed markets of US, UK, Australia, France, Germany, Singapore and Japan with no 
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African or Middle Eastern countries present.  As such I argue that underpricing will be more 
associated with asymmetric information generated from lower levels of state-level institutional 
quality.  In this light lower levels of institutional quality both informally disadvantage minority 
investors while also hindering their ability to prosecute detrimental actions taken by insiders.  In 
further contrast to the Boulton study which employs a variety of very different institutional indicators 
from equally different sources, I use the six well-recognized World Bank Governance (World Bank 
Governance, 2012) institutional quality measures.  These are: democratic voice and accountability, 
effective government, control of corruption, political stability and absence from conflict, regulatory 
quality and rule of law.  Consequently I test the hypotheses: 
 
H-3.1:  Corruption control is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
H-3.2:  Effective Government is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
H-3.3:  Political Stability is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
H-3.4:  Regulatory quality is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
H-3.5:  Rule of Law is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
H-3.6:  Voice and Accountability is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
 
2.5.  Impact of business angel and venture capitalist retained ownership on underpricing 
Retained ownership immediately following the IPO by either insiders or private equity entities is a 
very effective and credible signal of the true quality of the focal firm and its management (Leland 
and Pyle, 1977).  Retained ownership is costly on the part of insiders and private equity entities as 
this represents their forfeiting the first opportunity to maximise their own personal gain for 
liquidation of their investment (Bruton et al, 2010).  As such it is also indicative of the underlying 
motivations behind the underpricing for the various different categories of insider investor.  BA 
investors in particular have little to gain other than signalling quality through their retaining 
ownership post-IPO.  This class of investors act as their own principals (owners of the funds they 
invest) and as such their retained involvement in IPO firms signals the maintained benefits to the 
focal firm from their superior monitoring (Bruton et al, 2010).  Consequently I test the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H-4.1:  Business Angel retained ownership is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
 
Foreign VC managers have a similar degree of independence in terms of their decision making 
although this arises from having their being agents with principals located overseas (see Balboa and 
Marti (2007) for full review of agency in VC investment) and not subject to the cultural and 
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socialized norms of the local indigenous political economy.  Consequently foreign VC managers are 
more likely genuinely focussed on signalling undertaking signals to the market that would be 
otherwise costly to imitate (see Certo (2003) for full review of signalling).  As such I test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H-4.2:  Foreign VC retained ownership is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
 
However in direct contrast to BA investors and foreign VC entities that benefit from a relatively high 
degree of independence in their investment decisions, domestic VC is much more intricately tied to 
the local political economy.  This is through domestic VC entities either being owned, controlled or 
subject to considerable influence by extended family groups and social elites that form the local 
Maghreb political economy.  Consequently motivations to signal quality are subsumed by those 
aimed at retaining the control of insiders within the firm (Brennan and Franks, 1997), who are often 
socially linked to the domestic VC entity, either through belonging to same family business group or 
being part of overlapping network of family business groups.  Consequently I test the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H-4.3:  Domestic VC retained ownership is positively associated with IPO-firm underpricing 
 
3.  Data and Methods 
3.1.  Data 
The dataset constructed and used in this paper represent a comprehensive list of all IPOs undertaken 
on each of the national stock exchanges of the North African region, namely Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia for the period 2000 and 2013.  The evidence in Table 1 reveals that listing 
activity is sporadic owing to the smaller size of these markets with large periods of inactivity such as 
between 2000 and 2005 in Egypt and 2000 and 2004 in Morocco.  The smallest of the exchanges, 
Algeria, has failed to attract any listings since the period immediate following its inception in 
1999/2000.  Tunisia in contrast has had a very small but steady stream of listings over the sample 
period.  Consequently a total of 86 IPOs are included in the sample period. 
Table 1 
 
Flotation prospectuses were hand-collected from financial market regulator websites for Algeria and 
for Morocco while a combination of Thomson Corporation Perfect Information and Al Zawya 
databases were used to source Egyptian prospectuses.  Al Zawya database, the national stock 
exchange and direct contact with individual firms were used to source prospectuses for Tunisia.  We 
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exclude readmissions and transfers of listings between main and development boards while also 
excluding demergers, reorganizations and flotations of preferred stock, convertibles, unit and 
investment trusts.  Consequently the final sample is composed of 86 IPO firms that floated ordinary 
shares with single class voting rights.  Share prices were obtained from Bloomberg, DataStream and 
Al Zawya as well as direct from the national stock exchange in Algeria.  US$ Exchanges rates were 
obtained from Bloomberg.  The conversion of all values into US$ assumes long term parity between 
local currencies and US$ and mitigates against domestic inflation. 
 
3.2.  Variable Measurement 
Dependent variable:  underpricing 
Initial returns are used as the measure of IPO firm underpricing.  It is notable that there is 
considerable evidence of significant illiquidity, reflected in market inactivity and price rigidity, 
across all North African equity markets (see Lagoard-Segot (2013) for liquidity study on Tunisia, 
Ghysels and Cherkaoui (2003) for Morocco and Hearn (2010) for Egypt and Algeria as well as 
Tunisia and Morocco).  As such I follow Carter and Manaster (1990) and Filatotchev and Bishop 
(2002) in using initial returns calculated using the market-determined stock price at both 1 and 2 
weeks following listing (issue price): 
 
  iiiti IssueIssuegClongUnderpriciIPO  ,sin    (1) 
 
where Closingt,i is the closing price of firm i stock after t weeks (these being 1 and 2 weeks 
respectively) and Issuei is the issue price for the stock of firm i. 
 
Controls 
Firm controls 
Natural logarithm of Tangible Assets:  The natural logarithm of firm tangible assets in the pre-IPO 
year in US$ is a proxy for firm size in terms of tangible assets.  It was obtained from the IPO 
prospectus.  While this provides a direct measure of firm size it also has inferences at the stage of 
development of the firm’s activities and progression through the firm’s lifecycle (Berger and Udell, 
1998). 
 
Natural logarithm of firm age:  This is the number of years from establishment of firm to year IPO 
was undertaken.  This variable also has inferences on the development of firm’s through their 
lifecycles which in turn has implications for informational asymmetry (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
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Natural logarithm of revenues:  The natural logarithm of firm revenues in the pre-IPO year in 
US$ was obtained from the IPO prospectus.  Firm revenues are long established in the literature as a 
control for the variation in size as larger firms have greater economic growth opportunities (Rosen 
(1982); Smith and Watts (1992)). 
 
Debt to Equity ratio:  This is the ratio of all balance sheet liabilities (short and long term debt) to total 
shareholder equity as stated in listings prospectus for the year preceding IPO.  This has important 
inferences in terms of firm financing, which is closely related to its progression through lifecycle 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). 
 
IPO and Ownership Controls 
Shares offered divided by total shares:  This is a proxy for the size of the offer and is calculated as the 
number of shares offered divided by the total shares issued and outstanding.  This is justified by 
evidence from Ritter (1984) of a persistent relationship between initial returns, or underpricing, and 
size of offering while Ritter (1987) has documented economies of scale in the costs of listing.  These 
variables are obtained from IPO listings prospectus. 
 
Privatization:  This is a (1/0) dummy variable taking value 1 if IPO is a privatization of former state 
owned enterprise and 0 otherwise. 
 
Foreign Partner:  This is a (1/0) dummy variable taking value 1 if IPO is the listing of a joint venture 
or subsidiary of a foreign firm and 0 otherwise. 
 
Owner = Lead Manager:  This is a (1/0) dummy variable taking value 1 if the ultimate owners of the 
focal firm undergoing IPO is the same ultimate owner of lead manager employed and 0 otherwise.  
This variable in particular controls for the frequent co-ownership of business entities and market 
participants across the very small markets in Maghreb region. 
 
Institutional Quality:  I use a simple aggregated index formed from equal weighted mean of the six 
well established World Bank Governance institutional quality indices disseminated by World Bank.  
These have first been rescaled to dimensions of 0 to 10 to facilitate comparability.  The six measures 
are: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.  The construction and 
definition of each of the six indicators is outlined in detail on World Bank Governance website 
(World Bank Governance indicators, 2012) as well as in Hearn and Piesse (2013) and Hearn (2013). 
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3.3  Impact of private equity and lead managers on underpricing 
Hypotheses 1-1 to 1-3 and 2-1 to 2-2 respectively are tested using pooled cross sectional OLS 
regressions.  Country and industry fixed effects are applied.  The former controls for latent 
differences across countries while the latter control for pervasive differences across industries.  The 
focal variables outlined in hypotheses are defined as: 
 
BA:  This is a (1/0) dummy variable taking value 1 if business angels were involved in IPO firm and 
0 otherwise. 
 
Domestic VC:  This is a (1/0) dummy variable taking value 1 if domestic VC were involved in IPO 
firm and 0 otherwise. 
 
Foreign VC:  This is a (1/0) dummy variable taking value 1 if foreign VC were involved in IPO firm 
and 0 otherwise 
 
Lead Manager reputation:  The final reputation measure is the equally weighted aggregate of two 
sub-measures.  The first of these is constructed as the cumulative market share defined as the ratio of 
total amount raised by firms with that particular lead manager to the total raised across the market in 
line with Megginson and Weiss (1991).  So for the universe of all lead managers (or Chef de File), i,  
in each respective national stock market, the total gross proceeds raised across all IPOs throughout 
the entire sample time period, adjusted to its natural logarithm, is denoted as  

0
ln
t i
x .  We define 
the total attributed to each individual lead manager, denoted as j, throughout the entire sample time 
period, and again converted to its natural logarithm as  

0
ln
t j
x .  The lead manager reputation 
( jtLR 1 ) rank of each lead manager is given by expression 2 below: 
 
 
%100
ln
ln
1
0
0 ＊
x
x
LR
t i
t j
jt





       (2) 
 
The second sub-measure employs the same principle in gauging the frequency of IPOs within which 
each individual lead manager has been involved, even as a co-lead or operating as part of a syndicate, 
against the total number of IPOs in the market.  As such expression 2 is modified so 

0t j
x  is the 
total number of occurrences for each individual lead manager in IPOs within the national market, 
delineated as a 0/1 dummy where if lead is involved it is attributed value of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
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

0t i
x  merely indicates the total number of IPOs in the national market during the sample time 
period.  The final sub-measure for proportional ranking of IPO involvement and experience ( jtLR 2 ) 
is given in expression 3 below: 
%1002
0
0 ＊
x
x
LR
t i
t j
jt





       (3) 
 
Following the equally weighted aggregation of both sub-measures detailed in expressions 2 and 3, the 
aggregate reputation measure is superior to the Megginson and Weiss (1991) measure in being multi-
dimensioned (experience and share of proceeds) which is preferable in emerging economy IPOs as 
these are subject to considerable variation in size of offering and frequency. 
 
Lead manager foreign:  This is a (1/0) dummy variable taking value 1 if lead manager involved in 
IPO is foreign and 0 otherwise 
 
Each of the above focal variables are applied in turn to a pooled cross sectional OLS regression 
which contains all the control variables (firm as well as IPO and ownership) outlined in previous 
section 3.2.  The dependent variable in each case is underpricing. 
 
3.4.  Impact of institutional quality on underpricing 
Hypotheses 3-1 to 3-6 are tested using pooled cross sectional OLS regressions with both country and 
industry fixed effects applied.  However first the aggregate institutional quality measure (formed as 
an aggregate) is omitted before each of the six World Bank Governance institutional quality 
measures, defined previously in section 3-2, are sequentially added in turn to each model.  Owing to 
significant correlation and concerns of multi-collinearity between these measures they are not 
included altogether in a grand regression.  The institutional quality testing builds upon previous 
section which is reflected in all of the previous section’s focal hypothesis variables, namely BA, 
Domestic VC, Foreign VC, Lead manager reputation, Lead manager foreign, being included jointly 
as market factors alongside all of the firm, IPO and ownership controls outlined in section 3-2. 
 
3.5.  Effects of retained business angel and venture capitalist ownership on underpricing 
Finally hypotheses 4-1 to 4-3 are tested using two-stage least squares (2SLS) models owing to 
endogeneity and potential reverse causation and feedback between block-ownership post-IPO and 
levels of IPO firm underpricing.  Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2008) assert that market determined 
outcomes of block-ownership post-IPO are significantly less likely in civil code law countries owing 
 19 
to the underdeveloped nature of markets which somewhat mitigates the likely endogeneity this still 
have to be taken into account with the appropriate selection of methods which involves using 
separate exogenous instrument variables.  The ownership variables associated with hypotheses are 
defined as follows: 
 
BA own post-IPO (%):  This is ownership by BA post-IPO as stated in prospectus 
 
Domestic VC own post-IPO (%):  This is ownership by domestic VC post-IPO as stated in 
prospectus 
 
Foreign VC own post-IPO (%):  This is ownership by foreign VC post-IPO as stated in prospectus 
 
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) is a special case of instrumental variables regression.  This employs 
two distinct stages with the first stage finding the portions of the endogenous and exogenous 
variables that can be attributed to the instruments.  This stage involves estimating an OLS regression 
of each variable in the model on the set of instruments.  The second stage is a regression of the 
original equation, with all of the variables replaced by the fitted values from the first-stage 
regressions.  The coefficients of this regression are the 2SLS estimates.  The instrument variables are 
defined as follows: 
 
Instrument Variables 
Number of true independent nonexecutives:  This is the number of nonexecutives for whom there is 
no evidence in listings prospectus alluding to their affiliation in any way to CEO or controlling/ 
dominant block-shareholders who commonly have board representation 
 
Natural logarithm of employees:  This is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees or 
staff of the focal IPO firm in year immediately preceding IPO 
 
Number of business angels:  This is the number of business angel early stage investors as declared in 
listings prospectus. 
 
Family firm:  This is a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if firm is family controlled and 0 
otherwise 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
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4.1.  Descriptive statistics 
The evidence from Table 2 reveals that levels of underpricing across Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are 
generally between 20 – 30% while that in Algeria is extremely low reflecting a minimal stock market 
culture and awareness in business environment and hence extremely small size and activity of market 
with extreme illiquidity.  More generally all three forms of private equity target business groups and 
entrepreneurial firms led by CEO-Founders.  There is also significant evidence of industry 
specialization with the industries of finance, cyclical consumer goods, technology and energy 
accounting for over 70% of private equity activity in IPO market.  Finally the number of foreign VC 
entities in the region’s IPO market is small and relatively dispersed in type (agency, state, fund or 
bank-based).  However there is some specialization in domestic VC with state and agency based 
venture capital common in Morocco, state and bank-based venture capital in Egypt and an exclusive 
focus on agency venture capital in Tunisia (reflected in SICAV/SICAF funds) 
Table 2 
 
Table 3 outlines the top ten BA, domestic VC and foreign VC investors for each of the three principal 
North African markets, namely Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.  Generally there is a minimal 
participation of foreign VC across all three markets, although it is notable an Egyptian IPO firm was 
target of US entity Goldman Sachs and Morocco is subject to target investment from Tunisia.  More 
generally equity investment (stake) values are least in the case of BA investors and foreign VC and 
largest in case of domestic VC.  Average levels of divestment at IPO are also highest across BA 
investors and foreign VC with this being generally lower for domestic VC.  This would provide some 
evidence that foreign VC and to a lesser extent BA investors perceive IPO as a viable exit from 
investee firms. 
Table 3 
 
4.2.  IPO Firm underpricing 
The evidence from Table 4 reveals a lack of any support for hypothesis 1-1 while also revealing 
strong statistical support for hypotheses 1-2, 1-3, 2-1 and 2-2.  The evidence is particularly strong as 
all relationships maintain their size, direction (sign) and level of statistical significance (over 95% 
confidence margin) in both the individual models (models 2 to 6) as well as the grand regression 
model which includes all hypothesized focal variables together (model 7).  Further support arises 
from the considerable increases in explanatory power (R2) in models with each of the focal 
hypothesized variables, on top of controls, in models 3 to 6, over and above the explanatory power 
for model 1 which only includes controls.  Overall these results infer significant support for the 
“reduced monitoring hypothesis” of Brennan and Franks (1997), in relation to positive relationship 
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between domestic VC and lead manager reputation and increased underpricing, while the signalling 
or certification role of foreign VC and lead managers is dominant in reducing underpricing as argued 
by Certo (2003). 
 In terms of the controls and the positive relationship there is a large, positive and statistically 
significant (95% confidence level) association between underpricing and tangible assets while a 
negative and smaller association, generally one tenth of the absolute coefficient size) and of equal 
significance is present between underpricing and debt-to-equity ratio.  These results infer that 
underpricing is more common in larger sized firms as well as those that are more reliant on equity (as 
opposed to debt) financing.  In terms of the IPO and ownership category of controls and there is a 
large, negative and weakly statistically significant association (90% confidence level) between 
underpricing and ratio of shares offered to total shares issued.  This provides some further, albeit 
weak support for the reduced monitoring hypothesis where smaller share issues reflect deeper 
underlying motives concerning retention of control and thus minimal issuance of shares.  There is a 
very large, negative association with equally high statistical significance (99% confidence margin) 
between underpricing and aggregate institutional quality.  While this result lends further tacit support 
for the reduction in asymmetric information (owing to higher institutional quality) leading to 
decreasing motivation for underpricing as a means to compensate minority investors, it is subject to 
further study through its six disaggregated World Bank Governance component institutional quality 
measures in the next section 4-3.  The large, negative association between underpricing and 
privatization dummy, which has variable statistical significance across models 1 to 7, reveals a 
contrasting relationship to that expected from Boulton et al (2010).  Consequently in North Africa 
state divestments through privatization is more likely to leave more funds available to corporate 
insiders.  However it should be noted that privatized firms are relatively well known brands, and thus 
attract considerable attention of minority investors, while also insider motivations for exerting control 
via underpricing being used as a tool to stimulate excess demand for shares, as evidenced in 
Appendix Tables 1 and 2, and hence discriminatory rationing, is less prevalent than in private family 
business groups.  This is largely due to the separation of ownership from control being more directly 
in line with that envisaged by Brennan and Franks (1997), with state having concentrated cash flow 
ownership, as opposed to the separation being achieved through pyramids and cross-shareholdings 
which are especially sensitive to monitoring from minority block-shareholders.  There is a small, 
positive association between foreign partner dummy and underpricing which only attains statistical 
significance, at 90% confidence level, in grand regression model 7.  This infers some support for 
conjecture that firms with foreign partners, namely locally registered foreign joint ventures and 
subsidiaries, are likely to view underpricing as a means to stimulate demand so as to engender 
indigenization (local acceptability of brand) in shareholdings.  Finally there is a very large, positive 
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and highly statistically significant association (99% confidence level) between underpricing and 
ultimate owner equals lead manager dummy.  This evidence also lends further strong support to the 
Brennan and Franks reduced monitoring hypothesis in terms of underpricing being used ultimately to 
protect insider control. 
Table 4 
 
4.3.  Impact of institutional quality on underpricing 
Hypotheses 3-1 to 3-6 are tested through the sequential inclusion of each of the six individual World 
Bank Governance institutional quality measures on top of controls.  The controls are a combination 
of all the controls used in previous section (models 1 to 7), i.e. firm controls alongside IPO and 
ownership controls (less the aggregate institutional quality measure), as well as the combination of all 
five variables that were the focal hypothesized variables again from previous section (as in final 
grand regression model 7).  The evidence from Table 5 provides statistical support for hypotheses 3-1, 
3-2, 3-3 and 3-5, i.e. increased underpricing is associated with lower corruption control, effective 
government, political stability and rule of law.  In contrast hypotheses 3-4 (regulatory quality) and 3-
6 (voice and accountability) are unsupported.  However the strongest statistical support is for the 
negative association between corruption control and underpricing where the addition of corruption 
control measure over and above controls leads to an additional 8.7% increase in explanatory power 
(R2).  This single coefficient of association is the largest in absolute size (-2.894) with strongest 
statistical significance at 99-95% confidence margin.  In contrast the coefficients of association for 
effective government and political stability are less than half the absolute size of that for corruption 
control with statistical significance dropping to 95% and explanatory power increase (over controls) 
dropping to under 4%.  The rule of law association with underpricing is very weak and leading to an 
increase in explanatory power over controls of just over 1%. 
 The relationships between underpricing and all control variables are as documented in 
previous section 4.2.  However one notable difference is the increase in absolute size and statistical 
significance of relationship between underpricing and foreign partner dummy further supporting 
previous evidence that this is likely due to indigenization of ownership as a motive for underpricing 
to generate necessary demand for shares offered. 
Table 5 
 
4.4.  Effects of private equity and business angel retained ownership on underpricing 
Finally the evidence from Table 6 reveals statistical support for all three hypotheses: 4-1 to 4-3.  
There is a negative and statistically significant coefficient of association between underpricing and 
the retained ownership of BA investors (-0.022) and foreign VC (-0.004) with both being statistically 
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significant, though this is at 95% confidence level in former and only 90% in latter.  However there is 
a positive association between underpricing and retained ownership of domestic VC (+0.009) which 
is statistically significant at 95% confidence level.  It is also notable that the explanatory power (R2) 
is markedly lower in model 15 with only BA retained ownership, at 25.25%, while it is much higher 
for models 16 (30.44%) and 17 (32.43%) that include foreign and then domestic VC retained 
ownership respectively.  These results are in line with anticipated relationships from hypotheses in 
terms of certification (signalling) of value being dominant motivation for lack of underpricing in IPO 
firms with BA and foreign VC involvement.  I argue this is because these two private equity entities 
are relatively independent of domestic political economy forces, reflected in the Maghreb region by 
local economies being permeated with extensive (and often overlapping) family business groups.  As 
such both BA and foreign VC retained ownership is associated with signalling of quality, in line with 
both Leland and Pyle (1977) and Certo (2003).  In contrast however domestic VC is closely tied to 
the domestic political economy and hence underpricing is used to stimulate excess demand and thus 
discriminatory rationing of offered shares. 
 The relationships between underpricing and all control variables are again as documented in 
previous sections 4.2 and 4-3. 
Table 6 
 
5.  Conclusions 
This study provides a unique insight into the determinants of IPO firm underpricing in North Africa 
using a unique comprehensive and hand-collected sample of 86 IPOs from across the region, namely 
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, between 2000 and 2013. 
 The findings suggest that while foreign venture capitalists and lead managers are more likely 
to signal high quality of focal firm and its management leading to reduced underpricing, the opposite 
is true of domestic venture capitalists and lead managers with elevated reputation.  This is argued to 
reflect that foreign venture capitalists and lead managers are relatively independent of domestic 
Maghreb political economy which is overwhelmingly dominated by extended family groups and 
hence underscores their ability to signal quality free of political constraints.  However given the 
highly networked nature of Maghreb economy the opposite is true of domestic venture capitalists and 
lead managers with elevated reputation, acquired through their selection to participate more 
frequently in IPO market.  Here the reduced monitoring hypothesis of Brennan and Franks is 
maintained although its prescriptions are especially pertinent in firms where separation of ownership 
from control is achieved through pyramidal and cross-shareholdings rather than simple 
diversification.  As such the findings from my study have particular relevance to both regulatory 
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authorities and investors in countries with political economies overwhelmingly permeated with 
extended family business groups such as much of Asia, Latin America, Middle East and Africa. 
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Table 1. Number of IPOs in North Africa by market IPO activity, by market, from across North 
African region between 2000 and 2012. 
Year Total Algeria Egypt Tunisia Morocco 
 Marché 
principal 
Marché 
développement 
Marché 
croissance 
2000 5 3* 1 -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- 
2001 5 -- -- -- -- 3 -- -- 2 -- -- 
2002 1 -- -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2003 1 -- -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2004 2 -- -- -- -- -- -- 2 -- -- -- -- 
2005 10 -- -- 3 4 2 1 -- -- 
2006 13 -- -- 1 2 4 3 3 
2007 15 -- -- 2 4 5 3 1 
2008 10 -- -- 2 2 4 2 -- -- 
2009 1 -- -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2010 10 1 1 5 3 -- -- -- -- 
2011 4 -- -- -- -- 1 3 -- -- -- -- 
2012 2 -- -- -- -- 2 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2013 7 -- -- -- -- 7 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Total: 86 4 10 33 24 11 4 
Source: Compiled by author from national stock exchanges and regulators 
Note: * includes IPO listing from 1999/1998 
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Table 2. Distribution of IPO underpricing by country and private equity activity 
This table presents the distribution of IPOs and underpricing, or initial returns, statistics by listing country. Underpricing is calculated as the percentage difference between closing 
price at 1 and 2 weeks following listing and issue price as a proportion of issue price.  Institutional quality is the aggregated value of the six individual World Bank Governance  
measures of institutional quality as developed in Kaufman et al (2009) and downloadable from http://www.govindicators.org.   
Overall 
Market 
 Underpricing (1 week)    Underpricing (2 weeks)    Aggregate Institutional Quality  
  Mean Median Std. dev.    Mean Median Std. dev.    Mean Median Std. dev.  
 NIPO % % %   NIPO % % %   NIPO % % %  
Egypt 10 21.78 16.52 32.92   10 20.99 12.02 37.15   10 42.43 41.98 1.84  
Morocco 39 18.94 16.19 24.54   39 24.45 12.86 36.97   39 46.94 46.80 1.56  
Tunisia 33 27.07 21.43 27.06   33 28.08 24.40 30.29   33 50.84 50.38 1.73  
Algeria 4 0.78 0.00 1.56   4 0.78 0.00 1.56   4 28.97 27.39 3.55  
                  
Private 
Equity 
 Target investment type 
 Foreign VC   Domestic VC   Business Angels 
  FP State Business 
Group 
CEO 
Founder 
  FP State Business 
Group 
CEO 
Founder 
  FP State Business 
Group 
CEO 
Founder 
 NPE % % % %  NPE % % % %  NPE % % % % 
                  
Egypt 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  12 0.00 38.46 46.15 38.46  13 0.00 0.00 30.77 61.54 
Morocco 3 0.00 0.00 33.33 33.33  24 10.34 10.34 75.86 55.17  11 0.00 0.00 63.64 36.36 
Tunisia 7 42.86 0.00 85.71 57.14  22 0.00 4.00 44.00 56.00  13 30.77 0.00 69.23 61.54 
Algeria 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --  0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --  0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
                  
Private 
Equity 
 Type of Private Equity entity   Top 4 target industries 
 Foreign VC   Domestic VC   Domestic VC 
  State Agency Fund Bank   State Agency Fund Bank   Finance Cons Cyc Tech Energy 
 NT % % % %  NPE % % % %  NPE % % % % 
                  
Egypt 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --  12 23.08 7.69 23.08 46.15  12 38.46 7.69 -- -- 53.85 
Morocco 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --  24 48.28 41.38 3.45 6.90  24 13.79 37.93 27.59 -- -- 
Tunisia 2 0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00  22 0.00 80.00 4.00 16.00  22 20.00 28.00 24.00 4.00 
Algeria 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --  0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --  0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
US 3 33.33 33.33 33.33 0.00             
UAE 2 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00             
Saudi Arabia 3 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00             
Italy 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00             
Notes: NIPO indicates number of IPO firms within category; NPE indicates number of private equity entities; NT indicates the number of Foreign VC in terms of country of origin 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of top ten private equity investors, per category, per country 
This table contrasts the top ten private equity (PE) entities between the three Maghreb countries of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in terms of their mean level of divestment 
(difference between pre-IPO and post-IPO cash flow ownership) and mean (average) equity stake value, in US$m.  The total number of PE entities, in each category, per country 
are detailed alongside the overall mean (average) levels of divestment and equity stake value, in US$m.  It should be noted that all values are disaggregated to reveal the individual 
participation of individual PE entities in IPOs across the region as it is common for PE investment in target firms to adopt a consortium of several entities (both within same 
category i.e. a consortium of Foreign/Domestic VC or Business Angels as well as a consortium formed including a mix of these) 
Country Foreign VC Divest Mean 
Equity 
stake 
 Domestic VC Divest Mean 
Equity 
stake 
 Business Angels Divest Mean 
Equity 
stake 
 Name [Country of origin] % US$m  Name % US$m  Name % US$m 
Egypt Goldman Sachs [US] 10.91 100.80  Alexandria Bank 30.76 1,297.98  Abdelmoneim Al Rashid 0.00 178.61 
    Cairo Bank 30.76 1,297.98  Ola Lotfy Zaki 26.00 84.35 
    Egyptian for Insurance 30.86 648.99  Mohamed Abdullah M. Aldeghaim 29.17 59.30 
    Pension for Private Sector 0.00 648.99  Ahmed Amin Mahmoud El Abin 27.66 58.06 
    Misr Bank (incl. Misr Insurance) 0.00 230.71  Omar Mostafa Tantawy 32.26 56.81 
    National Bank of Egypt 0.00 282.80  Abdelaziz Al Saghir 0.00 48.37 
    Arab Co for Real Estate Dev. 0.00 189.78  Youssef Ben AbdAllah Ben Ali 
Bameqdam 
28.13 39.53 
    Financial Holdings International 0.00 119.07  Fahmy Assmat Abdel Magied 33.33 16.49 
    Shaeirk for Insurance 28.69 24.35  Yassraia Abdel Aziz Ragab Hosni 33.33 16.49 
    CIB 0.00 11.99  Soleiman Abu Numay 21.43 11.81 
           
Total: 1 Foreign VC 10.91 100.80  Total: 12 Domestic VC 17.01 384.62  Total: 13 Business Angels 24.10 45.73 
            
Morocco Pan-African Inv. Partners [US] 100.00 58.39  Mamda/MCMA 9.27 51.20  Noraddine El Ayoubi 35.00 45.05 
Maghreb Pvt Equity Fund 
[Tunisia] 
36.01 7.70  Al Qudrah 9.06 34.17  Chraibi Abdelmajid 0.00 5.59 
AfricInvest Ltd [Tunisia] 35.83 3.33  Fonds Capmezzanine 50.38 17.86  Héritiers Omar Laraqui 23.50 4.04 
    CIMR 9.09 17.03  Tahiri Abdelhak 17.44 3.61 
    SCR 9.09 17.03  Kenza Kabbaj 25.00 2.77 
    SMCD 9.09 17.03  Chakib Ben El Khadir 21.76 2.44 
    SOMED 9.09 17.03  Aicha Maarouf 30.71 1.15 
    Société Wafa Assurance 9.09 17.03  Alexandre Delieuze 30.95 1.04 
    CNCA 0.00 14.01  Héritiers El Ouarzazi 36.36 0.97 
    CDG (incl. Fipar Holding) 0.00 13.99  Abdelhakim El Youssfi 44.74 0.42 
           
Total: 3 Foreign VC 48.77 16.96  Total: 24 Domestic VC 21.55 11.88  Total: 11 Business Angels 28.38 6.13 
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Table 3 continued 
Country Foreign VC Divest Mean 
Equity 
stake 
 Domestic VC Divest Mean 
Equity 
stake 
 Business Angels Divest Mean 
Equity 
stake 
 Name [Country of origin] % US$m  Name % US$m  Name % US$m 
Tunisia IFC [US] 0.00 8.28  Société Bentec 30.00 7.37  Jomaa Ben Sandrine 15.38 5.52 
United Gulf Bank [UAE] 30.31 3.70  Al-Mal Investment Co. 30.30 2.31  Rekik Mohamed 29.99 4.93 
Societe Abdulazziz [SA] 16.02 1.57  STB Sicar 19.26 1.21  Bouali Fatma 0.00 1.83 
Global Investment House [UAE] 0.00 1.32  SIM Sicar 0.00 1.79  Faycal Achour 100.00 1.66 
Soc. Amine Jamil Aldalaoui [SA] 16.00 1.26  Union de Placement et de Conseil 
en Assurances et Reassurances 
20.00 1.44  Al Khouri Abdallah Abbes Ismail 0.00 1.28 
Industrie Ceramiche di Faenza 
[Italy] 
0.00 1.15  Sicar Invest 0.00 1.43  Talal Mohamed Abbas 0.00 1.28 
Groupe Commercial Baroum 
[SA] 
16.00 0.74  Challenge Sicar 15.96 1.34  Abdelhaq Farza 74.18 0.84 
    CIF Sicav 81.38 1.30  Chalhoub Ben Saleh Alchalhoub 16.06 0.39 
    ATD Sicar 42.40 1.29  Ali Ben Soliman Alchahry 15.99 0.39 
    Société El Bouniane 25.00 1.15  Abdullah Alrached Abou Niene 15.99 0.39 
           
Total: 7 Foreign VC 11.19 2.58  Total: 22 Domestic VC 22.14 1.27  Total: 13 Business Angels 26.62 1.50 
            
Source: Compiled by author from IPO listings prospectuses lodged with national regulators as well as individual firms 
Notes: (1) Classifications of Foreign VC, Domestic VC and Business Angels are derived from descriptions within IPO listings prospectuses 
 (2) SA denotes Saudi Arabia; UAE denotes United Arab Emirates; US denotes United States 
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Table 4. OLS regression analysis of board and lead manager characteristics on IPO Firm underpricing 
Table outlining results of determinants of IPO underpricing at 1 week following listing date.  BA, Domestic VC and Foreign VC are all dummy variables taking value 1 if these 
entities have equity holdings in focal IPO firm and 0 otherwise.  Lead Manager reputation is a market power variable constructed in the spirit of Megginson and Weiss (1991) in 
terms of relative market share of each broker with a particular market on basis of both gross proceeds raised by focal IPO firms that they have been involved in listing process 
and frequency of involvement in IPOs.  Lead Manager Foreign is a dummy taking value 1 if lead manager is foreign and 0 otherwise.  Log Tangible Assets is the natural 
logarithm of tangible assets, obtained from balance sheets of IPO listing prospectus and denominated in thousands of US$.  Log Firm Age + 1 is the natural logarithm of firm age 
at time of listings, defined as number of years from establishment to year of listing.  Log Revenue is the natural logarithm of firm gross (pre-tax and expenses) revenues in pre-
IPO year, denominated in thousands of US$.  Debt to Equity ratio is the ratio of debt and liabilities to shareholder equity in firm.  Shares Offered/ Total Shares is ratio of shares 
offered at IPO to total number of issued and outstanding shares post-IPO.  Institutional quality is aggregate and is as defined in Table 2.  Finally privatization, foreign partner and 
Onwer = Lead Manager are dummy variables taking value 1 if IPO is a privatization of a former state-owned enterprise, has a long-term foreign partner (more commonly 
associated with joint ventures and subsidiaries of foreign firms) and finally if ultimate owner of firm is the same entity as the ultimate owner of lead manager.  This last variable 
takes account of highly networked character of Maghreb economy with extensive business groups, routinely based on families, permeating state and private sector environments. 
 IPO Underpricing at 1 week 
Independent Variables Controls BA Domestic VC Foreign VC Lead Mgr. Rep. Lead Mgr. Foreign Grand Regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 1.855 [2.62] †† 1.851 [2.62] †† 1.783 [2.63] †† 1.921 [2.85] †† 2.029 [2.50] † 1.721 [2.36] † 1.956 [2.65] †† 
Hypotheses        
H-1.1 BA  0.008 [0.10]     0.018 [0.24] 
H-1.2 Domestic VC   0.122 [2.29]**    0.113 [1.79]** 
H-1.3 Foreign VC    -0.152 [-2.32] †   -0.220 [-2.98] †† 
H-2.1 Lead Mgr. Reputation     0.507 [2.20]**  0.577 [2.83] †† 
H-2.2 Lead Mgr. Foreign      -0.142 [-2.88] †† -0.078 [-1.58]* 
Firm Controls        
Log (Tangible Assets) 0.100 [2.10]** 0.101 [2.11]** 0.087 [1.82]** 0.106 [2.15]** 0.056 [1.28]* 0.123 [2.80] †† 0.060 [1.47]* 
Log (Firm Age) + 1 -0.021 [-0.43] -0.021 [-0.43] -0.011 [-0.27] -0.019 [-0.41] -0.008 [-0.16] -0.025 [-0.56] 0.004 [0.10] 
Log (Revenue) -0.065 [-0.94] -0.065 [-0.93] -0.049 [-0.77] -0.063 [-0.95] -0.050 [-0.67] -0.088 [-1.28]* -0.045 [-0.72] 
Debt to Equity Ratio -0.014 [-2.08]** -0.014 [-2.13]** -0.015 [-2.37] † -0.014 [-2.13]** -0.015 [-2.04]** -0.012 [-1.88]** -0.014 [-2.63] †† 
IPO and Ownership Controls        
Shares Offered/ Total Shares -0.412 [-1.28]* -0.416 [-1.28]* -0.403 [-1.28]* -0.456 [-1.48]* -0.476 [-1.39]* -0.421 [-1.15] -0.537 [-1.62]* 
Institutional Quality -3.548 [-2.86] †† -3.543 [-2.82] †† -3.580 [-2.88] †† -3.723 [-3.17] †† -3.912 [-2.73] †† -3.152 [-2.74] †† -3.929 [-3.11] †† 
Privatization -0.115 [-1.28]* -0.114 [-1.29]* -0.116 [-1.04] -0.134 [-1.33]* -0.199 [-2.97] †† -0.076 [-0.71] -0.210 [-3.58] †† 
Foreign Partner 0.005 [0.05] 0.005 [0.04] 0.023 [0.22] 0.009 [0.07] 0.081 [0.82] 0.005 [0.04] 0.113 [1.42]* 
Owner = Lead Mgr. 0.178 [3.91] †† 0.178 [3.92] †† 0.160 [3.28] †† 0.148 [2.84] †† 0.173 [3.59] †† 0.176 [3.76] †† 0.107 [2.23]** 
        
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 82 82 82 82 79 82 79 
F-statistic (probability) 2.85 [0.00] 2.67 [0.00] 3.11 [0.00] 2.90 [0.00] 3.36 [0.00] 3.11 [0.00] 3.95 [0.00] 
Adjusted R2 0.3027 0.2914 0.3428 0.3195 0.3772 0.3426 0.4754 
Change in R2 over controls  -0.0113 0.0401 0.0168 0.0745 0.0399 0.1727 
Notes: (1) *p<0.10; **p<0.05; †p<0.01; ††p<0.005. T-statistics are in parentheses; (2) White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
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Table 5. OLS regression analysis of institutional determinants on IPO Firm underpricing 
This table reports the results of IPO underpricing related to firm and market characteristics in addition to the six World Bank Governance institutional quality measures, namely 
corruption control, effective government, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and voice and accountability.  All variables are as defined in Table 4. 
 IPO Underpricing at 1 week 
Independent Variables Controls only Corruption 
Control 
Effective 
Government 
Political Stability Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of Law Voice & 
Accountability 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Intercept 0.090 [0.19] 1.118 [2.01]** 0.861 [1.25] 0.622 [1.11] 0.489 [0.64] 0.711 [1.14] -0.040 [-0.09] 
Hypotheses        
H-3.1 Corruption Control  -2.894 [-3.76] ††      
H-3.2 Effective Government   -1.571 [-1.83]**     
H-3.3 Political Stability    -1.061 [-2.05]**    
H-3.4 Regulatory Quality     -0.911 [-0.90]   
H-3.5 Rule of Law      -1.333 [-1.68]**  
H-3.6 Voice & Accountability       0.289 [0.59] 
Market factors        
BA 0.012 [0.15] 0.004 [0.06] 0.024 [0.30] 0.010 [0.13] 0.011 [0.13] 0.013 [0.16] 0.011 [0.13] 
Domestic VC 0.103 [1.60]* 0.106 [1.68]** 0.099 [1.61]* 0.104 [1.71]** 0.105 [1.68]** 0.098 [1.54]** 0.096 [1.47]* 
Foreign VC -0.191 [-2.14]** -0.181 [-2.33] † -0.214 [-2.57] †† -0.232 [-2.48] † -0.172 [-1.97]** -0.239 [-2.44] † -0.199 [-2.04]** 
Lead Mgr. Reputation 0.525 [2.34] † 0.605 [2.87] †† 0.629 [2.96] †† 0.556 [2.68] †† 0.501 [2.17]** 0.534 [2.33] † 0.520 [2.28]** 
Lead Mgr. Foreign -0.088 [-1.68]* -0.062 [-1.28]* -0.078 [-1.44]* -0.084 [-1.54]* -0.090 [-1.71]** -0.070 [-1.28]* -0.091 [-1.70]** 
Firm Controls        
Log (Tangible Assets) 0.055 [1.28]* 0.041 [0.91] 0.042 [0.94] 0.068 [1.56]* 0.072 [1.48]* 0.066 [1.48]* 0.063 [1.33]* 
Log (Firm Age) + 1 -2.99E-04 [-0.01] -0.014 [-0.37] -0.005 [-0.12] -0.001 [-0.04] 0.003 [0.08] 1.99E-05 [0.004] -0.003 [-0.08] 
Log (Revenue) -0.052 [-0.69] -0.021 [-0.30] -0.039 [-0.59] -0.041 [-0.58] -0.060 [-0.76] -0.045 [-0.61] -0.052 [-0.70] 
Debt to Equity Ratio -0.014 [-2.32] † -0.018 [-2.87] †† -0.019 [-2.88] †† -0.017 [-2.70] †† -0.014 [-2.47] † -0.016 [-2.57] †† -0.016 [-2.42] † 
IPO and Ownership Controls        
Shares Offered/ Total Shares -0.479 [-1.28]* -0.569 [-1.52]* -0.527 [-1.47]* -0.482 [-1.33]* -0.452 [-1.28]* -0.430 [-1.15] -0.466 [-1.28]* 
Privatization -0.108 [-1.37]* -0.111 [-1.59]* -0.135 [-1.98]** -0.168 [-2.83] †† -0.128 [-1.77]** -0.140 [-1.77]** -0.104 [-1.28]* 
Foreign Partner 0.155 [1.92]** 0.103 [1.49]* 0.150 [1.72]** 0.126 [1.57]* 0.131 [1.49]* 0.139 [1.68]** 0.146 [1.73]** 
Owner = Lead Mgr. 0.129 [2.09]** 0.097 [1.88]** 0.115 [1.92]** 0.125 [2.33] † 0.146 [2.21]** 0.117 [2.01]** 0.133 [2.05]** 
        
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
F-statistic (probability) 3.19 [0.00] 3.99 [0.00] 3.46 [0.00] 3.43 [0.00] 3.10 [0.00] 3.21 [0.00] 3.05 [0.00] 
Adjusted R2 0.4026 0.4896 0.4409 0.4376 0.4021 0.4142 0.3970 
Change in R2 over controls  0.0870 0.0383 0.0350 -0.0005 0.0116 -0.0056 
Notes: (1) *p<0.10; **p<0.05; †p<0.01; ††p<0.005. T-statistics are in parentheses 
(2) White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
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Table 6.  The effects of business angel and private equity ownership on IPO firm underpricing 
This table presents results from Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) models studying impact on IPO underpricing of 
retained BA, Domestic and Foreign VC ownership respectively.  IPO underpricing is estimated at 1 week 
following listing.  BA/ VC/ VC Foreign and VC Domestic ownership is percentage retained ownership by 
business angels, foreign venture capital and domestic venture capital post-IPO.  All independent variables are 
defined in Table 4.  Four additional instruments are used alongside exogenous independent variables.  These being 
ratio of independent nonexecutives to board size, natural logarithm of number of employees alongside dummy (0/1) 
variables indicating whether the firm is part of a business group, is a family controlled firm and then whether 
Business Angels, Foreign VC and Domestic VC are part of an investment consortium. 
Independent Variables IPO Underpricing at 1 week 
 BA Own (%) VC Foreign Own (%) VC Domestic Own (%) 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 
Intercept 2.033 [2.67] †† 1.907 [2.68] †† 1.602 [2.47] † 
Hypotheses    
H-4.1 BA own post-IPO (%) -0.022 [-1.98]**   
H-4.2 VC Foreign own post-IPO (%)  -0.004 [-1.28]*  
H-4.3 VC Domestic own post-IPO (%)   0.009 [2.15]** 
Firm Controls    
Log (Tangible Assets) 0.082 [1.68]** 0.097 [2.04]** 0.087 [1.77]** 
Log (Firm Age) + 1 -0.009 [-0.18] -0.016 [-0.34] -0.018 [-0.41] 
Log (Revenue) -0.053 [-0.77] -0.063 [-0.94] -0.040 [-0.65] 
Debt to Equity Ratio -0.015 [-2.16]** -0.014 [-2.06]** -0.015 [-2.34] † 
IPO and Ownership Controls    
Shares Offered/ Total Shares -0.314 [-0.96] -0.406 [-1.28]* -0.541 [-1.48]* 
Institutional Quality -3.931 [-2.93] †† -3.681 [-2.99] †† -3.130 [-2.61] †† 
Privatization -0.147 [-1.50]* -0.118 [-1.28]* -0.120 [-0.97] 
Foreign Partner 0.042 [0.31] 0.019 [0.16] 0.009 [0.08] 
Owner = Lead Mgr. 0.184 [3.45] †† 0.169 [3.54] †† 0.121 [1.68]** 
    
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 82 82 82 
F-statistic (probability) 3.34 [0.00] 2.71 [0.00] 3.13 [0.00] 
Adjusted R2 0.2525 0.3044 0.3243 
Notes: (1) *p<0.10; **p<0.05; †p<0.01; ††p<0.005. T-statistics are in parentheses 
(2) White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
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Appendix Table 1.  IPO Subscription statistics 
Company Date of IPO Type No. Shares 
Offered 
No. Shares 
Subscribed 
Funds 
Raised 
(US$m) 
Rate of 
Subscribe 
Panel 1: Morocco (2000 – 2012)       
Managem 11/07/2000  IPO 2,126,930 19,888,109 106.68 935.06% 
Unimer 29/03/2001  IPO 110,000 916,526 6.63 833.21% 
IB Maroc.com 10/07/2001  IPO* 83,500 139,802 4.40 167.43% 
BCP 06/07/2004  IPO 1,177,610 10,254,573 86.27 870.80% 
Itissalat Al Maghreb 13/12/2004  IPO 130,985,210 2,816,268,721 963.08 2,150.07% 
Sothema 21/02/2005  IPO 150,000 1,087,994 10.92 725.33% 
Dari Couspate 11/07/2005  IPO* 80,000 869,807 3.16 1,087.26% 
Lydec 18/07/2005  IPO 1,120,000 27,511,475 28.79 2,456.38% 
Risma 15/05/2006  Rights 1,041,066 25,487,128 28.56 2,448.18% 
Mediaco Maroc 12/06/2006  Rights 35,000 514,429 1.98 1,469.80% 
Cartier Saada 21/06/2006  Rights 120,000 2,031,846 2.54 1,693.21% 
Douja Prom Addoha 06/07/2006  IPO 4,725,000 82,556,234 315.97 1,747.22% 
Distrisoft Maroc 26/09/2006  IPO 76,387 3,686,941 5.20 4,826.66% 
Distrisoft Maroc 26/09/2006  Rights 33,613 3,686,941 2.29 10,968.79% 
Colorado  27/10/2006  IPO 270,000 10,082,592 15.86 3,734.29% 
Fenie Brosette 04/12/2006  Rights 338,984 13,976,494 11.43 4,123.05% 
Societe de Realisations Mecaniques 12/12/2006  Rights 70,000 1,243,562 3.12 1,776.52% 
Involys 14/12/2006  IPO* 166,000 3,620,248 6.00 2,180.87% 
Hightech Payment Systems 27/12/2006  IPO 195,000 5,744,774 18.95 2,946.04% 
Matel PC Market 28/02/2007 IPO 374,594 -- -- 17.26 -- -- 
Promopharm 15/06/2007 IPO 270,045 -- -- 29.60 -- -- 
M2M 04/07/2007 IPO 129,555 -- -- 17.67 -- -- 
Timar 17/07/2007 IPO 45,000 -- -- 1.96 -- -- 
Compagnie Generale Immobiliere 10/08/2007 IPO 3,681,600 -- -- 436.57 -- -- 
Atlanta 16/10/2007 IPO 1,005,720 -- -- 150.33 -- -- 
Societe Nationale d’Electrolyse et 
de Petrochimie 
07/11/2007 IPO 840,000 -- -- 130.79 -- -- 
Stokvis Afrique Nord 03/12/2007 IPO 183,903 -- -- 13.52 -- -- 
Salafin 17/12/2007 IPO 447,761 -- -- 37.37 -- -- 
Microdata 31/12/2007 IPO 126,000 -- -- 15.07 -- -- 
Delatttre Levivier Maroc 29/04/2008 IPO 125,000 790,000 10.99 632.00% 
Delta Holdings 15/05/2008 IPO 1,020,000 2,2440,000 113.15 2,200.00% 
Compagnie Miniere de Touissit 04/06/2008 IPO 490,040 7,061,477 36.22 1,441.00% 
Label Vie 02/07/2008 IPO 458,150 2,290,750 63.20 500.00% 
Alliances Developpment 
Immobiliere 
17/07/2008 IPO 2,915,000 84535000 240.77 2,900.00% 
Ennakl Automobiles 13/07/2010 IPO 3,000,000 23 690 732 185.19 790.00% 
CNIA Saada 22/11/2010 IPO 617,531 8272351 1,051.21 1,340.00% 
Stroc Industrie 30/06/2011 IPO 288,515 2,515,369 105.84 872.00% 
Jet Alu 09/12/2011 IPO 816,667 1,637,311 55.58 200.00% 
S2M 27/12/2011 IPO 240,000 372,640 14.27 155.00% 
Afric Industries 05/01/2012 IPO 110,770 634,368 17.78 572.00% 
       
Mean (Morocco):    4,002,254 108,969,568 109.15 1,958.07% 
Source: Bourse de Casablanca website annual reports 
Notes: (1) * indicates IPO + Rights; (2) Years omitted indicate no IPOs for that year 
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Company Date of IPO Type No. Shares 
Offered 
No. Shares 
Subscribed 
Funds 
Raised 
(US$m) 
Rate of 
Subscribe 
Panel 2: Tunisia (2005 – 2012)       
Société GIF-Filter 01/02/2005 IPO 333,300 616,605 3.71 185.00% 
Société ASSAD 01/03/2005 IPO* 480,000 480,000 6.69 100.00% 
Société Karthago Airlines 01/08/2005 IPO 2,000,000 9,780,000 7.12 489.00% 
Société Immobilière Tuniso 
Saoudienne 
2006 IPO 540,000 1,900,800 4.42 352.00% 
Société Essoukna 2006 IPO* 1,359,375 2,623,594 4.75 193.00% 
El Wifack Leasing 2006 IPO 600,000 1,122,000 2.50 187.00% 
Société Adwya 2007 IPO 3,000,320 12,061,286 6.03 402.00% 
Société Tunisie Profilés Aluminium 2007 IPO* 4,800,000 26,736,000 15.88 557.00% 
Société de Production Agricole 
Teboulba 
2007 IPO 522,742 538,424 4.53 103.00% 
Poulina Group Holding 19/08/2008 IPO 7,325,530 137,216,472 33.68 823.00% 
Placement** 9,344,470 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Société Automobile Réseaux 
Tunisien et Services 
07/04/2008 IPO 4,125,900 48,783,694 32.93 634.00% 
Placement** 3,570,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Placement*** 2,402,100 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Servicom 01/06/2009 IPO 1,000,000 1,397,307 2.48 140.00% 
Les Ciments de Bizerte 08/10/2009 IPO 8,809,460 8,848,898 77.17 100.00% 
Assurances Salim 19/03/2010 IPO 660,000 17,987,879 6.95 2,725.00% 
Tunis Re 26/04/2010 IPO 2,000,000 61,286,838 9.83 3,064.00% 
Carthage Cement 10/06/2010 IPO 20,337,846 319,853,829 27.14 472.00% 
Placement** 47,368,421 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Placement*** 3,293,733 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Ennakl Automobiles 12/07/2010 IPO 4,600,000 101,088,600 34.57 2,198.00% 
Placement** 4,400,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Modern Leasing 01/12/2010 IPO 1,000,000 21,497,692 5.97 2,150.00% 
Telnet Holding 17/05/2011 IPO 2,070,000 6,667,570  322.00% 
       
Mean (Tunisia):   3,450,762 41,078,289 20.84 799.79% 
       
Mean (Kenya – 2000 to 2006)   153,858,589   280.25% 
Source: Tunisia: Bourse de Tunis website annual reports; Kenya: Suntra Investment Bank, Nairobi 
Notes: (1) Kenya is used as a comparably sized English common law jurisdiction developing market for 
 reference and comparability (2) * indicates IPO + Rights; **Guaranteed Placement, 
 ***Private Placement 
 
